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THE REPLICATOR EQUATION AS AN INFERENCE
DYNAMIC
MARC HARPER
Abstract. The replicator equation is interpreted as a continu-
ous inference equation and a formal similarity between the dis-
crete replicator equation and Bayesian inference is described. Fur-
ther connections between inference and the replicator equation are
given including a discussion of information divergences, evolution-
ary stability, and exponential families as solutions for the replicator
dynamic, using Fisher information and information geometry.
1. Introduction
To address the question of in what sense is natural selection related
to information theory and statistical inference, we draw an analogy be-
tween Bayesian inference and models of natural selection available in
evolutionary game theory. Exploring this requires the use of informa-
tion theory which leads into the use of information geometry and the
common geometric structure of information geometry and evolutionary
game theory. Recognition of this framework leads to generalizations of
Bayesian inference and is explored in future work.
Bayesian inference and the discrete replicator equation share a re-
markable formal similarity. The continuous replicator dynamic can be
analyzed using some of the same techniques used in Bayesian infer-
ence, such as by the Kullback-Liebler divergence and with exponential
families. This paper describes these similarities and explains how in-
formation geometry illuminates the connection.
As a model of natural selection, the replicator dynamic models the
informatic behavior of the population distribution. Emerging purely
from information-theoretical constructions, the replicator requires no
Date: May 5, 2010.
2000 Mathematics Subject Classification. Primary: 37N25; Secondary: 91A22,
94A15.
Key words and phrases. evolutionary game theory, information geometry, infor-
mation divergence, replicator equation, Bayesian inference, information geometry,
Fisher information.
1
2 MARC HARPER
biological assumptions. This is because the geometry of evolution-
ary game theory comes from the information geometry of manifolds
of probability distributions. The theoretical results associated to this
geometry, such as Fisher’s fundamental theorem, are facts describing
the evolution of information captured by replicating systems.
1.1. Bayesian Inference.
Inductive inference is the only process known to us by
which essentially new knowledge comes into the world.
– R. A. Fisher, The Design of Experiments (1935) [8]
Bayesian inference is a discrete dynamical system utilizing Bayes’
Theorem for iterative dynamic inference. It is widely used in machine
learning, e.g. in spam filtering and document classification. Define
the process as follows. Consider a collection of events H1, H2, . . . , Hn,
along with Bayes’ theorem
P (Hi|E) =
P (E|Hi)P (Hi)
P (E)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n where
(1) the events constitute the entire state space:
∑n
i=1 P (Hi) = 1,
(2) P (Hi) is the prior probability of Hi,
(3) E is an event corresponding to newly encountered evidence
and P (E) is the marginal probability of E, where P (E) =∑n
i=1 P (E|Hi)P (Hi),
(4) P (Hi|E) is the posterior probability of Hi given the evidence
E.
The process adjusts the probabilities of the events H1, H2, . . . , Hn in
light of the evidence provided by the observation E, forming a dynamic
process
(P (H1), . . . , P (Hn))→ (P (H1|E), . . . , P (Hn|E)),
which can be iterated over a sequence of observations E1, E2, . . .. The
Kullback-Liebler information divergence DKL (P (H|E)||P (H)) is used
to measure the gain in information from passing to the posterior dis-
tribution.
1.2. The Discrete Replicator Dynamic.
The theory of evolution by cumulative natural selection
is the only theory we know of that is in principle capable
of explaining the existence of organized complexity. –
Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (1987) [7]
Consider a population of n types of replicating entities, such as
genotypes (e.g. possible viral genetic sequences) or phenotypes (e.g.
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eye color or investment strategies). Let xi be the proportion of the
population of the ith type and denote the population distribution
x = (x1, . . . , xn). The discrete replicator dynamic [6] is:
x′i =
xifi(x)
f¯(x)
, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n where
(1) The types completely describe the population so that
∑
i xi = 1,
(i.e. the set of all possible states is the simplex),
(2) fi(x) is the fitness of type i (dependent on the population dis-
tribution), f = (f1, . . . , fn) is the fitness landscape,
(3) f¯(x) =
∑n
i=1 xifi(x) is the average fitness, and
(4) x′i is the frequency of type i in the next generation of the popu-
lation, adjusted by the proportionality of fitness relative to the
average population fitness.
A population of a particular distribution obtains information about
the environment from the fitness landscape. Replication adjusts the
distribution of types in the population as dictated by the relative fitness
as measured by the fitness landscape. In light of fitness landscape,
some types proliferate while others decline, much like the probability
of a particular event is adjusted by Bayes’ theorem in light of new
evidence in Bayesian inference.
2. Formal Similarity of the Discrete Replicator Dynamic
and Bayesian Inference
The following dictionary describes the formal analogy of Bayesian
inference and the discrete replicator dynamic. This analogy was inde-
pendently discovered in [15].
Bayesian Inference Discrete Replicator
Prior Distribution (P (H1), . . . , P (Hn)) Population state x = (x1, . . . , xn)
New Evidence P (E|Hi) Fitness landscape fi(x)
Normalization P (E) Mean fitness f¯(x)
Posterior distribution P (H1|E), . . . , P (Hn|E) Population state x
′ = (x′
1
, . . . , x′n)
The fitness landscape provides the observation (evidence) in the in-
ference process and the population re-aligns proportionally. Bayesian
inference is a special case, formally, of the discrete replicator dynamic,
since the fitness landscape in each coordinate may depend on the en-
tire population distribution rather than only on the proportion of the i-
type, which is significant if n > 2. In the above formulation of Bayesian
inference there is no explicit dependence of the probability P (Hi|E) on
any event Hj with i 6= j.
4 MARC HARPER
Although the discrete replicator dynamic is intuitively satisifying,
the nonlinearity of the discrete dynamic makes analysis difficult. A
continuous version of the replicator equation is widely used and as a
differential equation has more tractable tools for analysis.
2.1. The Continuous Replicator Dynamic. The replicator dynamic
has an intuitive motivation as a general model of natural selection.
Suppose a function f from the simplex to Rn describes the fitness of
the population states (or mixed-strategies), with the i-th component
function fi giving the fitness of the i-th type, depending on the entire
population distribution. The intuitive idea of natural selection, trans-
lated from Dawkins’ Universal Darwinism, is that the relative rate of
change of the proportion of the i-th type should be given by the differ-
ence of the fitness of the i-th type and the mean population fitness. In
equations,
x˙i
xi
= fi(x)−
n∑
i=1
xifi(x) = fi(x)− f¯(x),
where f¯(x) denotes the mean of f(x). After rearrangement, the repli-
cator equation takes the form
x˙i = xi(fi(x)− f¯(x)).
The continuous analog can be obtained by a limiting process from
the discrete dynamic [6], followed by a change in velocity that does not
alter the trajectories [10] and a possible gauge transformation. Indeed,
defining a differential equation from the difference equation,
x˙i = lim
h→0
xi(t+ h)− xi(t)
h
≈ xi
′ − xi = xi
fi(x)
f¯(x)
− xi = xi
fi(x)− f¯(x)
f¯(x)
,
which is equivalent to the following equation after a change in velocity
because f¯(x) can be assumed to be strictly positive:
x˙i = xi
(
fi(x)− f¯(x)
)
.
This description, in light of the relationship to inference, identifies
the replicator dynamic as a continuous inference process. Since infor-
mation divergence plays an important role in Bayesian inference, it is
natural to study its uses for the replicator dynamic. First we must
define evolutionary stability.
3. Evolutionary Stability
A central question in evolutionary game theory is evolutionary sta-
bility [13,16]. An evolutionarily stable state (ESS) of the replicator dy-
namic is a population distribution that is robust to invasion by mutant
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types. Formally, a distribution xˆ on the simplex is called an evolution-
arily stable state of the replicator dynamic if xˆ ·f(x) > x ·f(x) (in some
neighborhood of xˆ). This means that xˆ is a better reply to all neigh-
boring strategies, and hence robust under the action of selection to the
invasion of nearby mutant strategies. Evolutionarily stable states are
asymptotic rest points of the replicator dynamic and correspond to the
concept of strong stability in dynamical systems [6, 10].
3.1. Kullback-Liebler Divergence is a Lyapunov function for
the Replicator Dynamic. The following theorem shows that the
Kullback-Liebler information divergence forms a Lyapunov function for
the replicator dynamic, given an evolutionarily stable state. In fact,
evolutionary stability is characterized by this property. A version of
this theorem was proved in [1] and in [3]. A similar result is proven
in [10], with the Lyapunov function V (x) =
∏
i x
xˆi
i .
Theorem 1. The state xˆ is an interior ESS for the replicator dynamic
if and only if DKL(xˆ||x) is a local Lyapunov function.
Proof. Let V (x) = DKL(xˆ||x) =
∑
i xˆi log xˆi −
∑
i xˆi log xi. Then we
have that
V˙ (x) = −
∑
i
xˆi
x˙i
xi
= −
∑
i
xˆi(fi(x)− f¯(x))
= −
∑
i
xˆifi(x) +
∑
i
xˆif¯(x) = −
∑
i
xˆifi(x) +
(∑
i
xˆi
)
f¯(x)
= −
∑
i
xˆifi(x) + f¯(x) = −(xˆ · f(x)− x · f(x)) < 0.
The last inequality holds if and only if xˆ is an ESS. Finally, by Jensen’s
inequality, DKL is minimized when x = xˆ, so it is a local Lyapunov
function. 
Viewing the state xˆ as the final or equilibrium distribution of the dy-
namic (analogous to the “true distribution” in an inference context),
we can interpret the quantity DKL(xˆ||x) as the potential information of
the dynamic system. As the system converges, the potential informa-
tion is decreasing and is minimized because it is a Lyapunov function.
This result is the continuous analog to the use of the Kullback-Liebler
divergence as a measure of information gain of Bayesian inference.
Within the neighborhood of the ESS, the system is minimizing the in-
formation divergence between the current population distribution and
that of the selectively stable configuration, that is it is minimizing the
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potential information in the system. The theorem shows that this is
an informatic characterization of evolutionary stability.
3.2. Potential Information and the Discrete Replicator Dy-
namic. The potential information DKL(xˆ||x) plays an analogous role
for the discrete replicator dynamic.
Theorem 2. Suppose that the fitness landscape is strictly positive, that
is fi(x) > 0 for all i and x. If the population distribution unfolds
according to the discrete replicator dynamic then xˆ is an interior ESS
if and only if the potential information is decreasing along iterations of
the dynamic.
Proof. First note that the ESS condition can be equivalently stated as
xˆ · f(x)
x · f(x)
> 1
for all x in a neighborhood of xˆ (using the assumption that the fitness
landscape is strictly positive).
Consider the difference in potential information of two successive
states P = DKL(xˆ||x
′) − DKL(xˆ||x). Assume that x is in the ESS
neighborhood of xˆ. Then,
P =
∑
i
xˆi log xˆi −
∑
i
xˆi log x
′
i −
(∑
i
xˆi log xˆi −
∑
i
xˆi log xi
)
=
∑
i
xˆi log xi −
∑
i
xˆi log x
′
i
=
∑
i
xˆi log xi −
∑
i
xˆi log
(
xi
fi(x)
f¯(x)
)
= −
∑
i
xˆi log
(
fi(x)
f¯(x)
)
≤ − log
(∑
i
xˆi
fi(x)
f¯(x)
)
= − log
(
xˆ · f(x)
x · f(x)
)
< 0,
where the log is moved outside the sum using Jensen’s inequality and
the logarithm in the last line is positive by the ESS condition. 
The proof shows that the state xˆ is an ESS if and only if the potential
information is decreasing along iterations of the dynamic, once again
giving a characterization of evolutionary stability.
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3.3. Exponential Families – Solutions of the Continuous Repli-
cator Equation. In Bayesian Inference, an exponential family pro-
duces a conjugate prior which is also an exponential family, possibly
of the same type. The analogous property for the continuous inference
equation, the replicator dynamic, is to be of the form of an exponential
family at each point on the trajectory. Exponential families are max-
imal entropy distributions [12], a property that corresponds with the
intuitive explanation of the action of natural selection from the intro-
duction. Define an exponential family to be a collection of distributions
of the form
p(x; θ) = exp
(
C(x) +
∑
i
θiFi(x)− ψ(θ)
)
,
for functions Fi, C, and ψ and parameter vector θ. These are maximal
entropy distributions with respect to constraints of the form E [Fi(x)] =
λi and can be derived with Lagrange multipliers.
The solutions of the replicator equation can be realized as exponen-
tial families [2, 5, 11]. Let xi = exp(vi − G) with v˙i = fi(x) and G(x)
a normalization constant to ensure that the distribution sums to one.
From the fact that
∑
i xi = 1, 0 =
∑
i x˙i and so
0 =
∑
i
x˙i =
∑
i
exp(vi(x)−G(x))(v˙i(x)− G˙(x))
=
∑
i
xi(v˙i(x)− G˙(x)) =
∑
i
(xifi(x))− G˙(x)
= f¯(x)− G˙(x)
Hence G˙ = f¯(x). Now xi satisfies
x˙i = exp(vi(x)−G(x))(v˙i(x)− G˙(x)) = xi(fi(x)− f¯(x)),
which is the replicator equation. In the case of a log-linear fitness land-
scape, explicit solutions can be derived [5]. In this case, the equation
for the variable v can be reduced to a linear differential equation, which
can be solved with eigenvalue methods.
An intuitive discussion of the above result is worthwhile. Entropy
is a measure of the extent to which the distribution has “spread out”
over the landscape. Natural selection acts to fit the available niches
in a fitness landscape, arriving at the maximal entropy distribution
allowed by the constraints of the landscape. In the absence of varia-
tion within the fitness landscape, the replicator dynamic is stable. In
fact, if fi(x) = c for all i and all x then any x is stationary (and a
Nash equilibrium), and the solution with maximal entropy distribution
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is the uniform distribution, which follows directly from the definition
of the exponential family. In the case of a variable fitness landscape,
natural selection re-aligns the population distribution to fill out the
landscape if not at equilibrium, at each point taking the maximal en-
tropy distribution available within the constraints of the values of the
fi(x).
4. Understanding the Connection
The connections between inference and evolutionary game theory
are not just formal coincidence. Information geometry explains the
commonality.
4.1. Information Geometry. The set of categorical distributions on
n variables forms a Riemannian manifold [4] via the Fisher information
metric
gij(x) = E
[
∂ log p
∂xi
∂ log p
∂xj
]
.
The exponential map of this manifold gives the exponential families
of the previous section. In information geometry, the replicator equa-
tion is known as the natural gradient. The gradient flow of the Fisher
information metric is the replicator equation. The Fisher information
metric can be obtained from the Hessian of the Kullback-Liebler infor-
mation divergence, localizing the asymmetric information divergence
to the symmetric Fisher information. The metric is known in evolu-
tionary game theory as the Shahshahani metric and the manifold is
identified with its embedding into the reals as the (n− 1)-dimensional
simplex. For explicit details see [9].
In this context, the intreptation of the replicator equation as a con-
tinuous inference equation is natural, and the properties of the dynamic
with respect to the information divergence and formal solutions as ex-
ponential families is less surprising. The replicator equation can now
be understood as modeling the informational dynamics of the popula-
tion distribution, moving in the direction of maximal local increase of
potential with respect to the Fisher information, and ultimately con-
verging to a minimal potential information state if a stablizing state
(ESS) exists in the interior of the state space.
The conceptual situation is similar to that of the Price equation,
a statistical relationship that models evolutionary processes but itself
relies on no biological assumptions. Indeed, the Price equation is equiv-
alent to the replicator equation [14]. Similarly, the Shahshahani geome-
try of evolutionary game theory has a purely mathematical origin from
information theory. This means that Kimura’s maximum principle and
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Fisher’s fundamental theorem are statements of mathematical and sta-
tistical facts that happen to model evolutionary processes rather than
facts about natural selection itself.
5. Discussion
The replicator dynamic is a continuous inference dynamic. It is a
process guided by the geometry of Fisher information. As a model
of natural selection, the replicator equation captures the informatic
change associated to the population distribution. The formal analogy
of Bayesian inference and the discrete replicator dynamic leads to the
interpretation and use of information theoretic quantities in evolution-
ary game theory.
In particular, the Kullback-Liebler information divergence can be
used to define a potential information for replicator dynamics, both dis-
crete and continuous, given an evolutionarily stable state. this property
is minimized by the action of the dynamic and characterizes evolution-
ary stability. The concept of exponential families gives formal solutions
to the continuous replicator dynamic.
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